

The Global War on Terror

(GWOT)

***And how the U.S. may approach it
(including some aspects of
force Transformation)***

H. H. Gaffney & Dan Whiteneck



EVOLUTION OF AL QAEDA TERRORISM

- **1980 ~ 1989** **Soviets invade Afghanistan; U.S. encourages Arab and Pakistani fighters to join battle; Saudi finance**
- **1989 ~ 1996** **Afghan civil war; Some Arab fighters wander off; incidents like WTC 1993; Osama emerges – in Sudan**
- **1996 ~ 2001** **Taliban wins in Afghanistan; Osama sets up there; tens of thousands of terrorists trained; more incidents**
- **9/11/2001** **U.S. attacked; responds: breaks Taliban, Osama into hiding; camps destroyed; terrorists hunted down in Hamburg and other places**
- **2001 ~ 2004** **Incidents from Casablanca to Bali by dispersed terrorists; Two-thirds of al Qaeda leadership captured**
- **2003 onward** **Iraq becomes the U.S. focus**
- **3/11/2004** **Madrid attacked – shows terrorists now a virtual network**



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THE MOMENTUM OF TERRORISM

The terrorists' network has gone virtual.

**They are out there in numbers –
but not enough numbers to be readily found
(not concentrated).**

**The universal view is that killing Osama and Zawahiri
(or even Zarqawi) won't end terrorism.**

**The system now has its own momentum – it is part
of the world scene:**

- It is the prime problem for U.S. security**
- But does it really drive all global affairs?**



IS IRAQ A DIVERSION FROM THE GWOT?


- ~~It was not the source of terrorism (a few old PLO types retired there to die, under house arrest); after the fact, Saddam paid \$25K to families of Palestinian suicide bombers.~~
- Some Special Forces assets have been diverted from the search for Osama and the pacification and reconstruction of Afghanistan and sent to the war in Iraq.
- Al Qaeda's threat has not diminished upon the removal of the Saddam regime.
- So far, the WMD that we feared Saddam might give away to terrorists has not been found.
- Iraq has become a magnet for terrorists from other countries (even if numbers not great, may have catalytic role, as they may have been in Chechnya).
- Could Iraq turn into another Soviet Afghanistan? (Both the U.S. and Soviets kept occupation troop numbers down).
- Loss of focus on solution to the Israeli-Palestinian situation.





THE LEVELS OF GLOBALIZATION: THREE WORLDS AT THE END OF 2002


The Core of Globalization



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EMERGING WORLD FOR U.S. SECURITY




Incidents 9/11 and after


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Their Net vs. Our Net: (I) Their Net




Their Net vs. Our Net: (II) Where U.S. is






CNA The Global War on Terror (GWOT)




STRATEGIES AGAINST THE TERRORISTS





HOW TO APPLY U.S. FORCES TO THE GWOT

(Assuming no new harboring state in which U.S. may intervene to effect regime change)




**GWOT: From the short vertical scenario
to the long horizontal scenario**



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THERE ARE COMPLEX DIMENSIONS TO THE SIMPLE CONFRONTATION




**What Transformation for
U.S. forces in
Homeland Defense?**

**What Transformation applies
in responses (or prevention)
in each of these situations?**




Two Extreme Outcomes in which U.S. Department of Defense May Play Big roles




If the terrorists are successful with another and even more dire incident, U.S. resources will be turned to homeland defense...

If the U.S. feels compelled to change more regimes, the resource implications would be huge....

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
TRANSFORMATION IN WAR FIGHTING, per OIF






BUT TRANSFORMATION FOR...

“PHASE IV,” STABILIZATION, NATION BUILDING???



...AND APPLYING THE SAME TO THE GWOT?




**HAVE TO PLAN ON OPERATING AT ANY MOMENT,
SO IT'S NOT "LONG-RANGE PLANNING" IN CLASSIC DEFENSE SENSE**



Transformation and GWOT: The domains of interaction

“T” = Transformation





Typology of studies for examining the GWOT

Global System level

Asking the big questions about the strategic environment and its connectedness, e.g:

- Understanding how terrorists diffuse in both the Islamic world and the advanced world
 - Coordinating the whole world against terror
 - Worldwide systems of ISR and their efficiency for this purpose
-

State level

Promoting government effectiveness, e.g.:


- Government connections with other governments and its ability to regulate/coerce those with connections, e.g., air & sea carriers, banks
 - Supporting reform in other states – or harassing them for harboring
 - Most appropriate use of military forces for the GWOT
 - Non-proliferation
 - Note the terrorists' advantages in not being connected to a state
-

Individual level

Strengthening programs and policies for individuals

- Only individuals can get culturally smart, learn languages, interact
- Only individuals imagine consequences, dream up innovations
- Individuals eventually track down Hambalis and KSMs, and in caves
- Policy leaders who order action are individuals: their cognitive maps?


CNA BIG BET STUDIES AT SYSTEM LEVEL






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A Spectrum of U.S. Tasks in the GWOT





BIG BETS AT STATE LEVEL (continued): ORGANIZED FORCES





WHAT FOLLOW-ON STUDIES?

Assumptions/projections:

What to do about it...

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. It's about Islamic world's troubles — joining globalization | 1. We'd better understand this |
| 2. But it's still only a few among them — who engage in terror: but of 1.3 billion, 100k is big number | 2. We have to understand how terrorists emerge from this |
| 3. Terrorists want to evict West, set up Islamic regimes, eliminate Israel | 3. We have to prudently judge whether this is possible |
| 4. Terrorists are really scattered, loosely organized, difficult to penetrate | 4. We have to map their network, track down people, financing, intercept incidents |
| 5. U.S. a particular target since involved in oil & Israel, humiliates local militaries, eroding culture | 5. Homeland defense, force and embassy protection, build relations with both Muslim and advanced countries |



WHAT FOLLOW-ON STUDIES? (cont.)

Assumptions/projections:

What to do about it...

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>6. This “war” will last a long time, it’s ideological, proceeds by incidents</p> <p>7. U.S. can’t fight it alone</p> <p>8. DOD can’t fight it alone: interagency and international</p> <p>9. DOD has unique capabilities and contributions – especially in dedicated long-term planning, surveillance and strike:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Wrap up Iraq occupationb. Catch Osama, pacify Afghan.c. SpecFor prepositioningd. SpecFor, other responsese. Work with local militariesf. Expand “constabulary” forcesg. Homeland defense | <p>6. Need to understand how to get upper hand, outlast them</p> <p>7. How to network with other governments, Muslim & others</p> <p>8. How to cooperate with other U.S. agencies, local militaries</p> <p>9. DOD unique capabilities and contributions must be brought to bear efficiently:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Iraq occupation lessons learnedb. Keep Afghanistan secure.c. SpecFor prepo in best placesd. Expand training programse. Civic actionf. Plan for nation-buildingg. Efficient stand-by for HLDh. Expand language, culture trng. |
|--|---|

REFORMING THE MUSLIM WORLD (I)

Objective: “Eliminate the breeding grounds;” “drain the swamp”

Divisions:

Arab countries (Morocco through Oman)

South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh)

Southeast Asia

Central Asia

**DOD role in all this?
Minimal (train the armies,
if they need them).**

Omissions:

Iran (not accessible yet)

Turkey (a model for the others)

African countries south of the Sahara with Muslim populations

General view: each country is different and takes a separate program

Political systems we are dealing with include:

Monarchies (Morocco, Jordan, Saudi, other Gulf states)

Pseudo-republics and semi-democracies (all others)

Measures:

**Simple terms: democratic procedures, human rights, modern education,
jobs, population controls**

**Much more complex: governance vs. democracy, civil society, massive
restructuring of economies, real technical education, empowering women**



REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Individual measures to enable countries to function well may duck the real problem: *connecting the countries to the globalizing world...*

Most at least awkwardly connected now...

- Some have oil (Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Saudi, Gulf states, Iran, Indonesia), which means they have lots of Western cash)
- Geographical proximity (especially for those on the Med)
- Huge number of immigrants, especially in Europe (Moroccans, Algerians, Lebanese, Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, et al.)
- Bombarded by media (all Algeria and Egypt used to stop when Dallas came on; now it may be al Jazeera)

Most have exploding youth, but not the economies to create jobs for them:

- Jobs come from manufacturing connections to global market;
 - Malaysia is the prime example (weaned from just primary products to manufacturing);
- But requires educated population and
- Investors (reorientation of oil wealth from welfare state to job creation?).

DOD doesn't have much of a role in all this – except to maintain security.

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CULTURAL CHANGE FOR DOD

It's a horizontal scenario

Traditional DOD

- Abstract testing in vertical scenarios against peers on a “battlefield”
- Maintain readiness
- Train
- Surge expeditionary forces in units
- Evolutionary programs
- Two major combats
- Operations as pick-up joint

State-on-State

“Engagement” DOD

- Alliance in the advanced world
 - Exercises
 - Technol. Sharing
- Presence in the Four Hubs
- Attack rogue states before they attack us
- Bogged down in Iraq and Afghan
- Operations as integrated joint

The golden age of the 1990s

DOD in GWOT

- Homeland defense
- Wide dispersal of forces – in smaller units
- Horizontal scenario: tiny progress
- Is every incident a defeat?
- Inside the less advanced countries
- Interagency and international

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Transforming U.S. Forces and The World

What we've understood to date about U.S. forces...



What's happened...

- No peer has appeared; state-on-state wars down
- Internal conflicts continue (numbers down, intensity up)

• Global terror appears (from stress of globalization)

• U.S. huge defense discourages others

U.S. hated in world (because of aggressive unilateralism and support of Israel)

- Globalization continues in most of world
- North Korea and Iran pursue nuclear weapons

What we foresee in the future for the world...






Transforming U.S. Forces and The World

What we foresee
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
So what does the U.S. do,
and with its forces?



Prepare for Homeland Defense

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BIG ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES






APPLYING TRANSFORMATION TO GWOT:

STRIPPING APART THE SERVICES' TRANSFORMATION PLANS

- I. Suppose GWOT were the only war left for the U.S. What would U.S. forces look like? (The zero based approach...)**
- II. What if GWOT were to be done just on the margin and does not require a major increase in resources?**
- III. What in Legacy Forces (and programs) could be stripped to really free up lots more resources for GWOT?**
- IV. What of future forces are not applicable to GWOT and could be either stopped or reduced in quantity?**

THEN EXTENDING ALL THIS OUT TO THE FUTURE...





EXPANDING ON CEBROWSKI'S CHALLENGES

“TRAJECTORY OF ‘THE GAP’:”

- **Horizontal scenarios**
- **Alternative futures of Islamic world**
- **Including its transactions with the advanced world**
- **“Systems perturbations” during the alternatives**
- **Connections to oil and the longevity of oil supplies and alternative fuels**
- **Implications for U.S. forces – what does the U.S. “exporting security” mean?**
- **Implications for cooperation**

SWINGING QDR TO GWOT:

- **10 big issues first, from the top, by October**
- **1,000 particular issues later, down in the staffs**
- **Solve coming DOD trainwreck by focusing on GWOT?**
 - **U.S. will still dominate the middle**
 - **Hedge on China**
 - **Leaner, dispersed air**
- **Look at S&T:**
 - **Traditional vs. new challenges**
 - **Can't tease GWOT out of traditional challenges**

SUMMARY: BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE GWOT

- 1. It's a horizontal scenario, that is, over a long time, punctuated by incidents – not a battle**
- 2. Just like the Cold War, it is an ideological war**
- 3. It will last a long time, like the Cold War, but with no clearly decisive end.
It will be a war of exhaustion, not attrition. We have to persist until they tire.**
- 4. The global terrorists are fighting modernity, globalization, connections to the advanced world.**
- 5. The terrorists:**
 - a. Swim in the sea of Islam;**
 - b. In the modern anonymous world of advanced nations (Europe & the U.S.);**
 - c. And in some desolate corners – like the African Sahel**

SUMMARY: BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE GWOT

- 6. U.S. needs to get them before they get us**
- 7. U.S. has to work internationally**
- 8. U.S. has to work interagency**
- 9. U.S. defense has a niche function, but DOD has superior ability to plan, organize, operate anywhere, and command.**
- 10. Cost (in DOD) may be low (unless need to invade and occupy a country)**
- 11. Technology will need to be tailored to the tasks – but it may not take highly sophisticated forces**
- 12. Cost may be high if U.S. has to do a lot of nation-building**

Back-up Slides



Summary of DOD Operational Roles in the GWOT

- Continued battle against the insurgency in Iraq, an insurgency that may have been augmented by outside terrorists.
- Continuing the search for Osama and Zawahiri in or near Afghanistan, while beating back the resurgent Taliban.
- Preparing and stationing Special Force and other forces to make raids, upon being cued by intelligence sources.
- Preparing for the next consciously harboring state—though we have no idea which country that may be. Occupying another state (in addition to Iraq) may put DOD even more into a nation-building role in order to defeat terrorism.
- MIO/LIO patrols and PSI patrols for WMD at sea and in air.
- Training local forces in other countries (JTF HOA is training Ethiopians and doing civic action in northern Kenya)).
- Preparing to augment homeland defense—which could take huge resources, especially after the next incident. DOD may contribute to defending the sea approaches, the air approaches, and augmenting border patrols. They would be needed to clean up after dirty, CW, or BW attacks.



Summary of DOD Program Changes for the GWOT

- The U.S. and advanced country network against the terrorist network is the name of the game. Both the physical network and the philosophy of networking need to be enhanced.
- ISR contributions may turn out to be most important—but how to conduct ISR efficiently, and isn't it interagency?
- The enlarging and equipping of Special Forces—but does it take much Transformation per se?
- A huge new effort needed to develop cultural sensitivity and knowledge of the Arab world (and Southeast Asia), including Arabic language training for many more people—and then respecting, promoting, and retaining those people.
- U.S. interagency netting must be established. This will not be quite like what DOD has in mind in netting itself.
- If the possibility of the U.S. having to do more nation-building along the lines of what it will be doing in Iraq for some years to come, in order to remove a country as a seed-bed for terrorism, much more study, planning, restructuring of ground forces, and resources will be needed.